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Risk is a central feature of political decision making. Prospect theory, an empirically correct theory of choice under
risk that deals precisely with this condition, therefore seems to have much to offer political science. Prospect theory’s
central finding is that individuals’ attitude toward risk depends on whether they face losses or gains. Confronting
gains, individuals are risk averse in their decision making; confronting losses, they are risk accepting.Where do these
preferences come from? Do they also hold for collective decision making? How can prospect theory help us to solve
puzzles in political science? This article addresses these questions by discussing some advances in evolutionary
biology, behavioural economics, psychology, neuro-economics and political science. The article shows that there is
increasing evidence that prospect theory preferences have an evolutionary origin and that these preferences extend
to collective decision making. Moreover, it demonstrates that political science can indeed gain from applying
prospect theory, as insights from prospect theory help to solve puzzles such as why some governments pursue
electorally risky welfare state reform but others do not.
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Almost all decisions by political actors entail a certain degree of risk, whereby risk is the
probability that an event occurs (e.g. losing the election) times the impact that it did (e.g.
losing office). For understanding the conditions under which specific decisions are taken
(and not others), we therefore need a theory that can deal with decision making under
risk. Prospect theory, a descriptively correct psychological theory of choice, is precisely
such a theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 2000). This theory’s central finding is that
people make different choices when facing losses and when confronting gains. In the face
of losses, people are risk accepting in their decision making. When facing gains, con-
versely, they act in a risk-averse way. Prospect theory hereby differs from rational choice
accounts based on expected utility in which people base their choices on end states, not
on losses or gains, and which typically assume that people are risk averse. In contrast to
cultural and constructivist critiques of rational choice, prospect theory accepts rational
choice’s choice-theoretic foundations.What the theory criticises is rational choice’s ability
to describe adequately how people make decisions under conditions of risk (Levy, 2003,
p. 215).
In the early 2000s, there have been several excellent overviews and reviews of (the value
of) prospect theory for political science (Boettcher, 2004; Levy, 2003; McDermott, 2004;
Mercer, 2005). Drawing on these works, among others, I first summarise prospect theory’s
central features and discuss behavioural biases. Next, I extend the existing literature on
prospect theory by discussing some of the advances in, among others, evolutionary biology,
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experimental psychology and neuro-economics.1 These advances help us to understand
better why people display prospect-theoretical preferences. Subsequently, I discuss (partial)
solutions to two key issues regarding the application of prospect theory in political science:
(1) the lack of a theory of framing; and (2) the extent to which prospect theory’s central
finding – originally based on individual decision making – extends to collective decision
making. While not endeavouring to offer a comprehensive overview of all papers using
prospect theory in political science that have been published in, say, the last five years, the
article next discusses a selection of recent studies in political science using prospect theory
which show how and when this theory can help one to understand political decision
making under risk better.The final section provides some conclusions.
Prospect Theory: Central Finding and Behavioural Biases
Three decades ago, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979) developed prospect
theory as a behavioural alternative to expected utility theory since the latter theory’s
predictions continually failed empirically (see also DellaVigna, 2009; Kahneman and
Tversky, 2000).According to Colin Camerer (2005, p. 129), prospect theory is much more
than an alternative for expected utility theory; it is ‘a perceptual and psychophysical
perspective to thinking about money, goods, and risk’. Prospect theory has certain
characteristics that distinguish it from other theories, such as expected utility theory on
which rational choice (institutionalism) is based. A principal feature of prospect theory is
that it posits that individuals’ risk tendency varies across contexts, with individuals being
risk averse in the domain of gains and risk accepting in the domain of losses.This means
that the propensity to take risks is thus not a stable personality trait, with some individuals
being prone to take risks while others always steer away from them (but see below).This
does not exclude the possibility that some people overall are more risk accepting or risk
averse than others (for a recent discussion of the heritability of risk attitude, see Zhong
et al., 2009).The context (domain of gains or losses) influences the degree and direction
of risk an individual is willing to take. Individuals use a reference point, usually the status
quo, to establish whether they find themselves in a situation or domain of losses or of
gains. The risks an individual is willing to take do not only depend on the context, but
are also asymmetric. Because individuals are loss averse, ‘losses loom larger than gains’
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 279) and ‘losses hurt more than equal gains please’
(McDermott, 2004, p. 298; see Camerer, 2005). Losses weigh typically two to two and a
half times more heavily than gains. Consequently, individuals adapt more rapidly to
positive changes in their situation (such as a pay rise) than to negative ones (such as a pay
cut), and losing twenty dollars hurts more than finding twenty dollars pleases. Loss
aversion, ‘an even more fundamental phenomenon than previous work has documented’
(Akalis, 2008, p. 390), makes people averse to change and thus reinforces the status quo.
Specifically, ‘individuals have a strong tendency to remain at the status quo, because the
disadvantages of leaving it loom larger than advantages’ (Kahneman et al., 2000, p. 163; see
also Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988).
The so-called negativity effect, summing up the ‘losses loom larger than gains’ proposition,
aggravates the status quo bias. A negativity effect refers to ‘the greater weight given to
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negative information relative to equally extreme and equally likely positive information’
(Lau, 1985, p. 119).Another bias is the certainty effect, which means that ‘people overweight
outcomes that are considered certain, relative to outcomes which are merely probable’
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 265).The deviations from the expected utility theory’s
predictions occur among other factors because of the combination of the above biases:
loss aversion, the status quo bias, the negativity effect and the certainty effect (see also
Gilovich et al., 2002; Jones, 2001; Jervis, 2004; Weyland, 2006). Jonathan Baron (2010,
p. 10) argues that political behaviour might be even more prone to decision biases and
fallacies than is market behaviour.
Going Back to the Roots: On the Origin of Behavioural Biases
Why do people display these biases in decision making? Why are we not what Richard
Thaler and Cass Sunstein (2008) label Econs, individuals who think and choose unfailingly
well and fully in line with textbook economics, but Humans, individuals who display
biases in decision making and consequently fail even to come close to the textbook
standard? An increasing amount of work drawing on evolutionary biology and neuro-
economics suggests that we, so to speak, cannot help ourselves, as this behaviour is
hardwired. Rose McDermott and her colleagues (2008), for example, propose that
prospect-theoretical preferences have an evolutionary origin (see also Camerer, 2005,
p. 129; Rieger, 2009). By adapting a model from risk-sensitive optimal foraging theory,
McDermott et al. show how risk-accepting behaviour in the domain of losses (e.g. when
facing starvation) and risk aversion in the domain of gains may be the optimal strategy for
an individual who: (1) endeavours to maximise his or her chances of survival over time;
and who (2) is subjected to an environment in which abundance and scarcity vary.
If prospect-theoretical ‘tendencies concerning risk propensity lie more deeply rooted in
human evolutionary psychology’ (McDermott et al., 2008, p. 336), the implications for
decision making are far-reaching. First, this suggests that cognitive biases, the deviations
from rationality, are hard to overcome. Second, and related, it indicates that individuals
may be not very likely to learn over time or through experience to overcome these
tendencies (Harbaugh et al., 2001).
Experimental evidence on primates, more specifically on capuchin monkeys, shows that
behavioural biases – such as loss aversion – also extend beyond the human species (Chen
et al., 2006). These monkeys prove to have clear preferences, as humans do, and their
preferences change when they are facing gambles (that is, in the presence of risk). The
monkeys preferred the experimenter who showed first one apple and later with a 50:50
chance delivered two apples instead of one over the experimenter who first showed two
apples and later with a 50:50 chance delivered one apple instead of two. This finding
suggests that monkeys too do not like to lose (by having first two apples and later only
one). Although Alan Silberberg et al. (2008) argue that there is a problem with Chen
et al.’s experimental design, the experiments of Benjamin Hayden and Michael Platt
(2009) support the latter’s finding that the decision patterns of humans and monkeys are
surprisingly similar. This result indicates that decision-making patterns and biases may
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indeed extend beyond species. Individuals’ tendency to make choices consistent with
prospect theory’s predictions may thus not only be hardwired, but loss aversion may be
an innate and evolutionary ancient feature of human preferences. It is a function of
decision-making systems, which evolved before the common ancestors of capuchins and
humans diverged (Chen et al., 2006, p. 520).
Given these findings on the evolutionary origin of prospect-theoretical preferences, it
comes hardly as a surprise that the greater sensitivity to losses than to gains according to
some studies shows up in our brain activity as well (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005;
Loewenstein et al., 2008, pp. 652–5; Smith et al., 2002). For example, based on experiments
with two individuals with damage to the amygdala – a region in the brain – and matched
control experiments with individuals without such damage, Benedetto De Martino and
his colleagues (2010) show that the amygdala likely plays an important role in the
computational process leading to loss aversion. That is to say, the amygdala is the neural
structure mediating loss aversion. However, earlier findings by Sabrina Tom and her
colleagues (2007) conflict with De Martino et al.’s results. Using functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine which brain systems represent potential losses
vis-à-vis potential gains at the time when a decision is being made (so-called decision
utility), Tom et al. find hardly any amygdala activity when the size of the potential loss
increases. Since amygdala activation typically occurs during negative affective responses
(such as fear, discomfort or vigilance), this would suggest that the amygdala’s role in loss
aversion is at least not necessary. These two examples indicate that people’s responses to
losses and gains do seem to be traceable in brain activity. However, how this happens
exactly and which neural structures are involved remains an area requiring more work.2
Problems in Prospect Theory
When applying prospect theory in political science some problems arise (see also Mercer,
2005). One of the issues is the aggregation problem (compare Levy, 1997, pp. 102–4). Since
prospect theory is developed as a theory of individual decision making, the question is
whether it is applicable to collective decision making.3 One way of getting around the
problem is by applying prospect theory to individual decision making. This is the route
taken by, for instance, Matthew Fuhrmann and Bryan Early (2008) in their study of an
ambitious and successful nuclear disarmament initiative – the Presidential Nuclear Ini-
tiatives (PNIs). Fuhrmann and Early demonstrate that prospect theory is the only account
that can explain president George H.W. Bush’s willingness to accept the risk involved in
the launching of PNIs as well as the timing of the initiative. By specifically focusing on
Bush’s decision making, Fuhrmann and Early circumvent the aggregation problem. John
Patty (2006) also studies individual decision making, specifically whether or not a voter
turns out for the midterm, congressional elections in the United States. Patty argues that
only those voters facing losses, that is, those voters unhappy with the policies of the
president, have an incentive to bear the costs of voting in the midterm elections. Hereby
loss aversion among individual voters can account for the puzzle that the president’s party
typically loses in the midterm election.
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In many studies of political behaviour, the aggregation problem is not circumventable
because collective decision making is what matters. But is it a problem? There is a
substantial body of experimental and empirical evidence – in a variety of (sub-)disciplines
that political scientists typically do not refer to – suggesting that this problem is smaller
than it may seem. Experimental evidence indicates that pairs of individuals violate the
predictions of expected utility theory in the same manner as do individuals (Bone et al.,
1999; see Kameda and Davis, 1990). Glen Whyte (1993), for example, uses six investment
decision scenarios to compare individual and group decision making in escalating com-
mitment – that is ‘the tendency to continue an endeavor, regardless of its merits, once an
investment in time, effort, or resources has been made’ (Whyte, 1993, pp. 430–1). Support
for prospect theory’s key finding was found at both levels of analysis, but the findings
were stronger at the group level. Since political actors’ decision making often involves
sunk costs, prospect theory seems especially suited for accounting for such behaviour.
Anton Kühberger’s (1998) meta-analysis of 248 published journal articles from fields as
diverse as medicine, applied psychology and business – all experiments with human adults
focusing on risky decision making – also supports the assumption that prospect theory
applies to collective decision making.
Summing up, the aggregation problem may not be that big a problem after all. Regarding
individuals’ decision making, the aggregation problem by definition does not materialise
and prospect theory is applicable. With respect to collective decision making, prospect
theory is usable because experiments, meta-analyses and real-world data indicate that
groups display the same pattern of risk attitudes as do individuals and are in line with
prospect theory.
Another pending issue is that prospect theory lacks a theory of framing. Consequently, it
is unclear how to determine when political actors consider themselves to be in a gains or
losses domain. There is a large body of research suggesting that framing does matter, as
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) demonstrated in their well-known ‘Asian disease’ experi-
ment (see also Kam and Simas, 2010; for a discussion of studies examining framing effects,
see, e.g. DellaVigna, 2009, pp. 347–8). Despite an attempt by Michael Kanner (2005) to
develop a formal dynamic theory of framing and work by Cindy Kam and Elizabeth
Simas (2010) that shows who is more or less likely to be affected by different frames,
this problem is far from being solved. This lacuna therefore warrants attention in future
work.4
The Gain of Prospect Theory in Political Science
Against the backdrop of the possible hardwiredness of prospect-theoretical preferences
and the at least waning problems of applying this theory empirically, what is the gain of
prospect theory in political science? What do studies employing this theory have to offer
and what can studies that do not use it gain by doing so? In past years, there have been
quite a few scholars in International Relations (IR) who have employed prospect theory
(two recent contributions include Sheafer and Dvir-Gvirsman, 2010; Tir, 2010). Since the
sub-disciplines International Political Economy (IPE) and Comparative Politics (CP) have
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been particularly slow on incorporating prospect theory in their work, this section –
admittedly selective and incomplete – discusses some recent contributions that focus on
IPE and CP. With regard to the former, a recent paper by Deborah Elms (2008) is very
helpful for demonstrating the value of prospect theory and of behavioural economics
more broadly. Specifically, Elms convincingly shows that insights from behavioural eco-
nomics often offer a more convincing account of puzzles in IPE than do rival accounts.
To support this claim, Elms selects three publications from a key IPE journal, International
Organization, of which she discusses the empirical puzzle and the original explanation.
Subsequently, she shows how the same puzzle is solved more convincingly by drawing on
insights from behavioural economics, such as loss aversion.
An interesting contribution in CP is Annette Steinacker (2006), who uses insights from
prospect theory to explain why governments act on certain externality problems but not
on others. Steinacker argues that because of loss aversion, governments are more likely to
act on a situation constructed as entailing a negative externality than one that produces
a positive externality. Hereby, she offers a simple yet convincing explanation for an
otherwise puzzling phenomenon.
This author (Vis, 2009; 2010) focuses on the puzzle that some governments are willing to
accept the great electoral risk involved in unpopular welfare state reform, while other
governments of similar political colour and facing the same institutional circumstances
refrain from pursuing unpopular policies. I argue that by influencing the risk attitude,
and thereby the willingness to pursue risky reform, socio-economic and political gains
and losses drive governments’ behaviour in welfare state reform (see also Vis and
Van Kersbergen, 2007).5 I show that in almost all instances in which British, Danish,
Dutch and German governments between 1979 and 2005 pursued unpopular welfare
state reform, the government faced a deteriorating socio-economic situation (e.g. falling
growth rates, rising levels of unemployment). My analysis reveals that a deteriorating
socio-economic condition is necessary for the occurrence of unpopular reform. Hereby,
I empirically demonstrate the value of a prospect-theoretical account for understanding
better the politics of welfare state reform.
Focusing on party behaviour, Zeynep Somer-Topcu (2009) shows that parties shift their
policies more if they have lost the previous election than when they have won it. She
proposes that a lost election signals to a party that public opinion has moved away from
its policy position. For safeguarding future gains, changing the party’s policy in line with
public opinion thus seems a logical strategy. However, compared to doing nothing,
changing a policy position is a risky option since it is very hard – if not impossible – to
know beforehand what will be the precise effect of the policy change. A party that
changes its policy position is thus risk accepting, while a party that does not change its
policy position is risk averse.Which of the two a party chooses to do depends on the past
election result, whereby the time elapsed since the previous election functions as a
moderating variable.
A prospect-theoretical account can also help to explain existing findings in CP better. For
example, Lucio Baccaro and Marco Simoni (2008, p. 1323) pose the intriguing question
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of why some governments (but not others) are willing to ‘share their policy-making
prerogatives with trade unions and employer associations, not just informally by incor-
porating their inputs but also formally by setting up a bargaining table and engaging in
negotiations with them over public policy’. Based on four paired case studies, Baccaro and
Simoni show that being weak electorally is an important condition for sharing policy
prerogatives. Being strong electorally, that is, holding comfortable majorities, is conversely
an important condition for moving away from such sharing. According to Baccaro and
Simoni (2008, p. 1342), the weak governments are willing to do so because ‘it allows them
to activate supplementary channels of consensus mobilization. [These governments] are
willing to bring the trade unions on board when these still pose a credible threat for the
smooth implementation of policy, but their organizational fortunes have been declining in
recent times, thus moderating their bargaining policies’. Baccaro and Simoni’s finding not
only tallies well with prospect theory’s central finding, but prospect theory can also help
to explain this finding better. Confronting gains (a comfortable majority in parliament),
governments are unwilling to give up what they have and act in a risk-averse way. In such
a context, they have no reason to give up something (in this case policy-making
autonomy) and – being loss averse – they thus will not do so. The situation is very
different for governments in a dire electoral situation. Faced with such losses, these
governments may go out and gamble by giving up something (part of their policy-making
autonomy) to recoup some of the losses incurred (attempting to become stronger
electorally again). Overall, adding prospect theory places Baccaro and Simoni’s interesting
finding on a stronger theoretical footing.
Summing up, this overview of studies demonstrates the value of prospect theory for
explaining collective decision making.This is not to say that prospect theory is the only
possible explanation: on the contrary. Prospect theory’s insights may also supplement
other explanations of collective decision making, such as the power of interest groups or
dynamic pressures within legislative arenas. More precisely, these insights may foster a
better understanding of these processes, such as under which conditions interest groups
are able to influence policy making.
Concluding Remarks
By bringing together literature from (sub-)disciplines as diverse as evolutionary biology,
psychology, behavioural economics, neuro-economics and political science, this study has
set out to further the discussion on prospect theory in political science in three ways.
First, it has shown that there is increasing theoretical and neurological evidence that
individuals’ tendency to behave as predicted by prospect theory (that is to say, the
tendency to decide differently when facing losses than when facing gains) has an
evolutionary origin and is thus hardwired in our cognitive system. Even though indi-
viduals can of course try to make decisions consistent with economic textbooks – acting
as Econs – such an evolutionary root suggests that we are more likely to fall prey to
decision-making biases such as loss aversion – making us Humans (Thaler and Sunstein,
2008). Whether they like it or not, the context or domain in which individuals find
themselves (losses or gains) thus influences decision making. Facing prosperous conditions,
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or gains, individuals take risk-averse decisions because they want to hold on to what they
have. Confronting setbacks – losses – individuals take risk-accepting decisions since they
try to recoup (some of) the losses suffered. Also the biases giving rise to this type of
behaviour, such as loss aversion, seem to be hardwired. While we still only have scant
understanding of exactly how our brains function, the evidence thus far suggests that
people’s responses to losses and to gains are visible in the brain.
The second contribution of this study is that it proposes that the so-called aggregation
problem may not really be a problem. There is ample experimental and empirical
evidence indicating that prospect theory’s central finding extends to collective decision
making. Moreover, many political decisions are individual so that prospect theory applies
directly.
The third and final addition to the literature of this article is its (non-exhaustive) overview
of some recent contributions of prospect theory, in IPE and CP, to illustrate the value of
prospect theory in the sub-disciplines of political science. Given its promise of unravelling
theoretical and empirical puzzles and given that some of the problems of applying
prospect theory empirically have been reduced, many applications of prospect theory in
the field may – and it is hoped will – follow.
(Accepted: 10 February 2011)
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1 See Loewenstein et al. (2008) for an overview of neuro-economics.
2 See Levy et al. (2010) for some recent examples.
3 Note that this problem does not apply solely to political science but also to other (sub-)disciplines focusing on collective decision
making, such as organisation studies.
4 Another challenge relating to prospect theory is how to move from the laboratory to the field (Mercer, 2005, pp. 12ff.). The
increasing body of literature that applies prospect theory to ‘real-world’ questions suggests that prospect theory also holds
explanatory value outside the laboratory.
5 What exactly count as gains and losses in collective decision making is a difficult question, whereby the answer depends on the
research question at hand and the public policy under study.When decision making is multidimensional in that it involves trading
off goals as well as trading off courses of action, for example, applying prospect theory is not that straightforward. In this latter
case, it may make sense to try to divide the decision-making process into several steps, with the gains and losses assessed per step.
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